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The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
A Systemic Solution for the U.S. Multinational
James C. Nobles, Jr.
Christina Maistrellis1
U.S. companies doing business abroad face innumerable obstacles. One of those obstacles
is the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA or the Act), which prohibits bribing for-
eign officials to obtain business.2 The FCPA now has been on the books since 1977; how-
ever, in complying with the Act, U.S. companies doing business abroad in some respects
face greater challenges now than they did at the time of the FCPA's enactment. The past
two decades have seen a rapid expansion of global business. U.S. companies now aggres-
sively pursue business expansion in markets that were not even options in 1977. In many
of these new markets they encounter corruption at a level which is virtually a part of the
culture; they face competition from foreign companies with different attitudes toward
both commercial and governmental bribery. The FCPA risks for U.S. companies are
enhanced because they must adopt innovative techniques of doing business in these mar-
kets, including the use of brokers, agents, representatives and other "go betweens" over
which they have little control. In this environment, U.S. companies must reevaluate how
they do business abroad to avoid violations of the FCPA.
Bribery appears to be more prevalent in international business than ever before. The
question of whether this seemingly apparent increase in corruption is a real increase in
absolute terms, or simply is a reflection of a heightened awareness coupled with exposure
to business practices in many newly-opened economies is debatable. Irrespective of the
situation, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) mem-
ber nations have agreed to undertake actions to combat bribery of governmental officials
in international transactions.3 The OECD Recommendation on Bribery in International
Business Transactions represents the first multilateral effort to prevent international busi-
ness corruption outside of the money laundering area. This increased focus on bribery
of foreign governmental officials is part of a broader focus on business ethics in the
international arena by Transparency International, the Caux Round Table and similar
organizations. 4
1. ©1994, James C. Nobles, Jr. and Christina Maistrellis, All Rights Reserved
2. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (b), 78dd-1,
78dd-2, 78ff (a) & (c) (1988)); See also, U.S. Firms Bemoan Their Disadvantage Vying for Foreign
Work Without Bribes, Wall St. J., June 10, 1994, A6, col 1; Buying Business, Wall St. J., November
5, 1993, at Al; Foreign Corrupt Practices Act - Compliance and Enforcement Procedures, N.Y. Law
J., December 15, 1980, at 29, col. 1.
3. RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE OECD, May 27, 1994, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Press Release.
4. See Breaking the Spiral of Corruption, Fin. Times, April 15, 1994; Saints and Sinners Fin. Times,
March 25, 1994; and The Search for Universal Ethics, Fin. Times, July 22, 1994.
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Although the U.S. business entity clearly has had potential liability under the Act
since its enactment, the emphasis in recent years on criminal liability of organizations has
changed the stakes for U.S. businesses. The foundation of this increased emphasis is an
escalation in the degree of regulation of business by federal and state governments.
Concurrent with increased regulation, federal prosecutors have shown an elevated inter-
est in pursuing business crimes. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), 5 which
"standardize" the sentencing of entities, support the federal prosecutors' efforts in pursu-
ing business entities.
FCPA violations are clearly within the bribery provisions of the Guidelines for
Organizational Sefendants, which were issued in 1991.6 The Guidelines place a premium
on having effective programs in place to "prevent or detect violations of the law.''7 If an
entity has established a compliance program which meets the requirements of the
Guidelines, the Court is permitted to subtract three (3) points in calculating the entity's
"culpability score" which forms the basis for sentencing in all violations of federal crimes,
including violations of the FCPA.8 The FCPA penalties are substantial. Under the 1988
amendments to the FCPA, the monetary penalties were increased from $1 million to $2
million for business entities, and from $10,000 to $100,000 for individuals. 9 Of course,
the most formidable penalty for violating the Act is a five (5) year prison sentence which
individuals face for each violation of the Act.10 For the U.S. multinational, perhaps the
most significant deterrent is the embarrassment and tarnished reputation which results
from being charged with a violation of the FCPA. For others, FCPA charges can jeopar-
dize their businesses. 11 Moreover, defending FCPA charges significantly drains manage-
ment time and financial resources.
In theory, the FCPA is straightforward. Bribery of foreign governmental officials in
order to obtain a commercial advantage is prohibited. In practice, the answers to many
FCPA questions are often varying shades of gray, but are rarely black and white, clear-cut
answers. The nature of international business today makes it quite possible for an "inad-
vertent" violation of the FCPA to occur. The fact patterns involving FCPA issues usually
raise potential violations of other laws 12 and business ethics issues. These factors translate
into a need for U.S. companies doing business internationally to develop methods of
addressing liability risks under the FCPA. These risks can be decreased, and even elimi-
nated through the development, adoption and application of policies and procedures
within companies. For the practitioner advising a company on adopting a FCPA policy, it
is imperative that he or she have a thorough understanding of the FCPA, including the
5. 18 U.S.C.S. Appx. (1994).
6. See, 18 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 8C2.5(f) cmt. 10 (1994).
7. 18 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 8C2.5(f) (1994).
8. Id.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff (c), 78dd-2 (g) (1988).
10.Id.
11. See Lockheed Faces Possible Action by Air Force, Wall St. J., June 24, 1994, A12; Lockheed Barred
from Exporting Hercules, Fin. Times, August 26, 1994, 1, col 3; and Lockheed Unit will be Denied
Permits for Exports on Illegal Payment Charge, Wall St. J., August 25, 1994, B1, col 3. See Sheldon
Krantz, In a Hanging Mood, Mar/Apr. 1994, Bus. L. Today 5.
12. See notes 106-111 and accompanying text.
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standard of intent for violations under the FCPA. Thus, this article will provide a brief
overview of the FCPA, discuss the standard of intent applicable to the FCPA, outline the
elements of an FCPA policy, and conclude by addressing how a FCPA policy might be
applied in hypothetical situations.
I. The FCPA - A Primer
In response to information that some U.S. companies were routinely bribing foreign
governmental officials in order to obtain business, Congress saw a need for a strong
antibribery law.13 In 1977, Congress filled this perceived "gap" in U.S. law by enacting the
FCPA as an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). 14 In
1988, Congress amended the FCPA as a part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act (OTCA), 15 in order to clarify the standard of intent and other ambiguous
provisions. 16 The FCPA has two distinct provisions - the antibribery prohibitions and
the accounting controls. 17
A. ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS: WHAT IS PROHIBITED?
Under the FCPA, both direct and indirect bribery of foreign governmental officials is
illegal.' 8 With respect to direct bribery, the FCPA makes it unlawful to use the U.S. mail
or another instrument of U.S. interstate commerce 19 to "corruptly"20 make a payment to
13.S. REP. No. 114,95th Cong., 1st Sess., (1977).
14. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (b), 78dd-1,
78dd-2, 78ff (a) & (c) (1988).
15.Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (signed by President Reagan on August 23, 1988)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1982)). See Section II infra.
16. See note 74 and accompanying text.
17.15 U.S.C. 9§78m(b), 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1988).
18. Reference to a "payment" within the text of this article includes an "offer, gift, promise to give, or
authorization of the giving of anything of value." 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (a) (issuers), 78dd-2 (a)
(domestic concerns) (1988).
19.15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (a) (issuers), 78dd-2 (a) (domestic concerns) (1988). As is the case in other
areas, interstate commerce is defined broadly for FCPA purposes. For example, a phone call
from the United States, or a flight from a U.S. airport is interstate commerce. See e.g., United
States v. Silicon Contractors, Inc., a FCPA case where part of the scheme for transferring an illicit
payment involved a trip from Louisiana to the Cayman Islands. The "instrumentality of inter-
state commerce" used in violation of the Act was the Louisiana airport and the interstate and
foreign bank processing channels. See Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What is to
be Done with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 20 Vand J. Transnat'l L. 431, 484 (1987) citing
Offer of Proof, Silicon, Crim. No. 85-251 at 4 (E.D. La., filed June 27, 1985). See United States v.
Silicon Contractors, Inc., Exhibit A, 2 FCPA REP. 697.14 Crim No. 85-25 1.
20.15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (a) (issuers), 78dd-2(a) (domestic concerns) (1988). For a detailed explana-
tion of the "corrupt" aspect, see note 68 and accompanying text.
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a foreign government official21 in order to influence him to act (or not to act), or to
induce him to use his influence within the government, in order to obtain, retain or direct
business to a particular person or entity.22 In addition, the Act prohibits making pay-
ments to any foreign political party23 or foreign party official, or to any candidate for for-
eign political office with the purpose of securing a business opportunity.24
The Act contains identical prohibitions on indirect bribery. No payment may be
made to a third party with the knowledge25 that it either directly or indirectly will be used
to influence a foreign official or foreign political party or candidate.26 Under this prohibi-
tion, a U.S. company can be vicariously liable27 for the acts of a third party, such as a for-
eign agent or a sales representative.
An important and well-known exception to the FCPA is that "facilitating or expedit-
ing" payments (also known as "grease payments") made to foreign officials in furtherance
of "routine governmental action" are permissible. 28 Although the OTCA amended the
facilitating or expediting payments exception in an attempt to clarify its scope 29 , consid-
erable ambiguity continues to surround this exception. While permitted payments can be
made under the grease payments exception for actions which are "ordinarily and com-
monly performed by a foreign official,"30 the definition of "routine governmental
21. A "foreign official" includes "any officer or employee of a foreign government or any depart-
ment, agency, or instrumentality," as well as any person who acts in an "official capacity" on
behalf or for a government department or agency. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (f)(1) (issuers), 78dd-2
(h)(2) (domestic concerns) (1988). This definition, like other FCPA provisions, is open to inter-
pretation. For example, whether an officer of a state-owned business would be considered a for-
eign official is unclear. See, Hurd Baruch, International Transactions Which Violate the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act or Other Criminal Statutes, in 11 U.S. Reg. Int'l Trade, 1, 22 (1989).
22.15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (a)(1)(A)&(B) (issuers), 78dd-2 (a)(1)(A)&(B) (domestic concerns)
(1988).
23. Reference to a "foreign official" within the text of this article includes any foreign political party,
party official or candidate for foreign political office.
24.15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (a)(2) (issuers), 78dd-2(a)(2) (domestic concerns) (1988).
25. See Section II infra for a detailed analysis of the "knowing" standard.
26.15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (a)(3) (issuers), 78dd-2 (a)(3) (domestic concerns) (1988).
27. Vicarious liability is "indirect or imputed legal responsibility for acts of another; for example,
the liability of an employer for the acts of an employee, or, a principal for torts and contracts of
an agent." Black's Law Dictionary 1566 (6th ed. 1990).
28.15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (b) (issuers), 78dd-2 (b) (domestic concerns) (1988). In fact, in some coun-
tries the prohibitions of the FCPA are so well known that governmental officials demand bribes
by requesting "facilitating payments". In other, less sophisticated countries, government officials
solicit "tips"
29.The original FCPA's description of a facilitating payment - which allowed payments to officials
with "essentially ministerial or clerical duties" - generated confusion because it focused on the
role of the payee instead of a transaction's effect. (FCPA of 1977, § 103(a), § 78dd-1 (b) (issuers)
(1977); id., § 104 (a) 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (b) (domestic concerns) (1977).
30.15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (b) (issuers), 78dd-2 (b) (domestic concerns) (1988).
Spring 1995 9
action" 31 is narrow. The payment of bribes for all governmental actions which are routine
is not permissible. The Act does not extend the exception to routine governmental actions
which involve "any decision by a foreign official ... to award new business to or to contin-
ue business with a particular party."32 Thus, decisions by foreign officials which may
bring a company business and are discretionary in nature, regardless of whether they
involve an ordinary activity such as obtaining a license, are prohibited. 33
B. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
The FCPA's accounting provision requires "issuers,' 34 or publicly traded U.S. compa-
nies to take two affirmative measures to prevent and uncover unlawful payments. First,
issuers are required to keep their books, records and accounts "in reasonable detail." 35
Second, issuers also must create internal accounting control systems to give "reasonable
assurances" that steps have been taken to "record transactions as necessary" in order to
conform with accounting principles, and to "maintain accountability for assets." 36
Although the FCPA does not mandate a particular monitoring system, companies are, in
effect, required to create a due diligence policy for their accounting standards. A company
can be criminally liable for violation of the accounting provisions if they are "know-
ingly" 37 circumvented; otherwise, civil liability is the government's recourse. 38
C. WHo is COVER.D?
The classes of persons covered by the FCPA are bifurcated. The antibribery provi-
sions have a broader application since they apply to all "domestic concerns,' 39 as well as
to issuers. 40 A domestic concern includes any business enterprise (corporation, partner-
ship, association, joint-stock company, etc.) which either was created under the U.S. laws,
or has its principal place of business within the United States.4 1 Furthermore, "any indi-
vidual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States:' falls within the category
3 1. Actions which qualify as "routine governmental actions" include: "(i) obtaining permits, licens-
es, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; (ii) pro-
cessing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing police protection,
mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or
inspections related to transit of goods across country; (iv) providing phone service, power and
water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities
from deterioration; or (v) actions of a similar nature." 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (f)(3)(A) (issuers),
78dd-2 (h)(4)(A) (domestic concerns) (1988).
32.15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (f)(3)(B) (issuers), 78dd-2 (h)(4)(B) (domestic concerns) (1988).
33. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., (1988).
34. For an explanation of the "issuers" category, see notes 43-44 and accompanying text, which dis-
cusses who is covered by the FCPA.
35.15 U.S.C. § 78m (b)(A) (1988).
36.15 U.S.C. § 78m (b)(B) (1988).
37. For a discussion of this standard of intent, see section II supra.
38.15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (4),(5).
39.15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1988).
40.15 U.S.C. §78dd-1 (a) (1988). By definition, issuers are a subset of domestic concerns. For an
explanation of issuers, see notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
41.15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (h)(1)(B) (1988).
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of a domestic concern.42 As a result of the wide reach of this provision, all U.S. compa-
nies, as well as individual U.S. employees, find themselves subject to the prohibitions and
penalties of the antibribery provisions of the FCPA.
The FCPNs accounting standards apply only to "issuers' a much narrower class than
domestic concerns. 4 3 Issuers are U.S. companies who either must register with the SEC
according to § 12 of the Exchange Act of 193444 or must file reports with the SEC pur-
suant to § 15(d) of the 1934 Act. 45 The accounting standards are not as broad as the
antibribery provisions; however, the group of companies which are "issuers" and thus
subject to the accounting controls is large. For example, foreign corporations which regis-
ter their stock with the SEC for sale and trading on U.S. exchanges are issuers.
The extraterritorial reach of the FCPA does have limits. Foreign corporations not hav-
ing stock registered in the United States do not fall within the definition of an issuer or
domestic concern. 46 However a foreign individual who acts as an agent for either a U.S.
resident or domestic concern will be subject to the FCPA if a court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the action. 47 In addition, all U.S. residents and citizens are clearly covered
by the FCPA regardless of whether they are employed by foreign entities or employed
42.15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (h)(1)(A) (1988).
43.15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2) (1988).
44. Companies which are required to register with the SEC include those who participate in inter-
state commerce, whose securities are exchanged on the national stock exchange, whose assets
amount to over $1 million, and those who have over 500 stockholders. 15 U.S.C. § 78.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (b) (1988).
46. The Act generally does not apply to foreign corporations, including foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations. See Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428, 239 (D.D.C. 1992)
(because the legislative history of the FCPA reflects Congress' concern for international comity,
whether dealing with "a U.S.-owned foreign subsidiary or a foreign corporation" the FCPA did
not reach the British corporations which were defendants in the case). See H.R. Rep. No. 640,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (the House Report's proposal to allow the FCPA to reach foreign sub-
sidiaries was not adopted). The assumption that foreign corporations are exempt is further sup-
ported by the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs' Report which states that the
FCPA would not apply to "all overseas payments." The Committee described a hypothetical situa-
tion in which a foreign national made a payment for a foreign subsidiary without the use of U.S.
interstate commerce, and without informing the U.S. company of the transaction; it concluded
that this example would fall outside the FCPA's reach. S. Rep. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977),
Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure Acts of 1977.
47. See Dooley, 803 F. Supp. at 439. The District Court of the District of Columbia interpreted the fol-
lowing statement in the legislative history: "[F]oreign nationals or residents can be liable in cer-
tain circumstances." The court held that this statement meant Congress intended for the FCPA to
apply to foreign individuals, but not to foreign corporations. The Saudi Arabian defendants in
Dooley were therefore subject to the FCPA because they were foreign individuals who were
allegedly acting as agents for a domestic concern, were within the United States and satisfied the
minimum contacts needed for a U.S. court to assert jurisdiction. The court reasoned that "[o]nce
a foreign individual is found to be under the jurisdiction of a U.S. court, concerns about interna-
tional comity are limited" Id. at 440.
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abroad.48 Moreover, a U.S. parent corporation would be liable for illegal FCPA payments
made by its subsidiary if U.S. prosecutors could prove that the U.S. parent was aware of,
sanctioned or authorized the payments. 49 Foreign governmental officials are not subject to
prosecution in the U.S. either for violating the FCPA or conspiring to violate the FCPA. 50
D. COULTERAL CONSEQUENCES
In addition to criminal liability under the FCPA, the payment of bribes to foreign
governmental officials can have important collateral consequences. The payment of a
bribe can be a violation of other criminal laws in addition to the FCPA.51 If U.S. govern-
ment funds are involved (e.g., as in the case of the Foreign Military Sales program), a per-
son disclosing that payment to the U.S. government could receive an award under the
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989.52 FCPA violations can also jeopardize the defen-
dant's contracts with the federal government.5 3 For large defense contractors, disbarment
from U.S. government contracts could well be the most significant deterrent to engaging
in conduct proscribed under the FCPA.
Illegal FCPA payments also have U.S. tax consequences. In calculating its taxable
income, a U.S. taxpayer is not permitted to deduct any payments made in violation of the
FCPA.54 Even illegal payments made by foreign corporations who are not U.S. taxpayers
48. The Act does not define "resident" thereby creating substantial ambiguity as to the scope of cov-
erage for non-citizens. This omission is particularly'puzzling in view of the fact that under U.S.
law "resident" is defined in different ways for different purposes. Cf., I.R.C. § 7701(b) for the
definition of "resident" for income tax purposes; Treas. Reg. § 20.0-1 (b) prescribing those resi-
dents subject to U.S. estate and gift taxes (i.e., domiciliaries); and resident according to the
immigration laws means "the general place of abode."; and 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (30), (33) defin-
ing "residence" for immigration purposes.
49. An authorized payment would satisfy the intent standard needed to incriminate an issuer or
domestic concern for indirect bribery. See §§ 78dd-1 (a)(3), 78dd-2 (a)(3). Furthermore, if the
U.S. company is an issuer, the government has the option of prosecuting it for a failure to main-
tain the proper accounting controls required in §78(m)(b)(B). S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., (1977).
50. United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming the dismissal of an indictment of
foreign governmental officials under the general conspiracy statute for conspiracy to violate the
FCPA on grounds that Congress did not intend that foreign governmental officials have liability
under the FCPA).
51. See Section III infra which discusses other criminal statutes which could apply.
52. Pub. L. No. 10 1-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
53. See Lockheed Faces Possible Action by Air Force, Wall St. J., June 24, 1994, A12; Lockheed Barred
from Exporting Hercules, Fin. Times, August 26, 1994, 1, col 3; and Lockheed Unit will be Denied
Permits for Exports on Illegal Payment Charge, Wall St. J., August 25, 1994, B1, col 3. See Sheldon
Krantz, In a Hanging Mood, Mar/Apr. 1994, Bus. L. Today 5.
54. I.R.C. §162(c)(1). The tax implications of the payment of foreign bribes offers an unique insight
into how different countries view actions illegal under U.S. law pursuant to the FCPA. For exam-
ple, Dutch tax law permits a Dutch taxpayer to deduct bribes, tips and kickbacks in calculating
taxable income for Dutch tax purposes. Article 7, Dutch Income Tax Act of 1964. Under Dutch
law, two criteria must be met in order for a taxpayer to deduct the payment. First, the taxpayer
must be considered to be trustworthy. Second, the taxpayer must show that the circumstances in
12 NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas
may have a U.S. tax impact. For example, a United States shareholder of a foreign corpo-
ration which is a Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC)55 must include in income as
Subpart F Income5 6 any illegal bribes, kickbacks, or other payments paid by the CFC dur-
ing the taxable year.5 7 Included as Subpart F Income are those payments made by the
CFC which would be "unlawful under the [FCPA] if made by a United States Person'
Further, a CFC may not reduce its earnings and profits for U.S. tax purposes by the
amount of the unlawful FCPA payment.5 8
E. AFFIRMATiE DEFENSES
There are two affirmative, but limited, defenses to the FCPA. First, an affirmative
defense exists if the payment is legal under the written laws of the foreign country.5 9
Since it is unlikely that a foreign country's laws would sanction bribery of its officials, this
exception is of little importance. The second affirmative defense is for a "reasonable and
bona fide expenditure,' such as travel and lodging expenses; this payment can result from
either "promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services:' or from carry-
ing out a contract with a foreign government. 60
F GUIDELINES AND OPINIONS BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
In response to criticism from the U.S. business community that the Act was unwork-
able,61 the 1988 amendments recommended that the Attorney General issue guidelines
for the FCPA, and directed the Attorney General to provide advisory opinions from time
to time in response to inquiries by companies who are concerned with whether prospec-
tive conduct will violate the Act. 62 As of 1990, the Attorney General had not issued any
Note 54, continued
the foreign country are such that it is likely that the taxpayer would be required to make the pay-
ment in order to achieve sound business goals (thereby increasing the taxable profits in The
Netherlands). Disclosing the identity of the beneficiary of the payment is not a condition prece-
dent under Dutch law to deducting the payment. It is the authors' understanding that, in prac-
tice, Dutch taxpayers discuss the tax treatment of the payments with Dutch tax authorities
before the payments are made in order to obtain advance approval for the deduction. In con-
trast, under German law, bribes and kickbacks may be deducted in calculating taxable German
income; however, the identity of the payee of the bribe or other illegal payment must be dis-
closed to the German tax authorities.
55. See I.R.C. § 951 for a definition of"Controlled Foreign Corporation".
56. See I.R.C. § 952 defining Subpart F Income and I.R.C. §-95 1(a)(1)(A) requiring a current inclu-
sion of Subpart F Income in the U.S. taxable income of a United States shareholder.
57. I.R.C. § 952(a)(4).
58. I.R.C. § 964(a).
59.15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (c)(1) (issuers), 78dd-2 (c)(1) (domestic concerns) (1988).
60.15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (c)(2) (issuers), 78dd-2 (c)(2) (domestic concerns) (1988) (emphasis in
original).
61. See Judith L. Roberts, Revision of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by the 1988 Omnibus Trade
Bill: Will it Reduce the Compliance Burdens and Anticompetitive Impact? 1989 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 491.
62. The OTCA removed the Attorney General's discretion to deny an advisory opinion, and imposed
on the Attorney General a 30 day time constraint to issue an advisory opinion after receiving a
completed request. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd- I (e)(l) (issuers), 78dd-2 (f)(1) (domestic concerns) (1988).
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guidelines interpreting the FCPA,63 however the Attorney General has issued several advi-
sory opinions. 64 When the Attorney General issues an advisory opinion, the opinion cre-
ates a "rebuttable presumption" that the conduct specified in the request complies with
the antibribery provisions of the FCPA.65 This presumption "may be rebutted by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence."66
II. Standard of Intent
The FCPA's antibribery provisions prohibit both direct and indirect bribery pay-
ments which are made "corruptly in furtherance of "securing business. 67 The corrupt
standard of intent "connotes an evil motive or purpose" such as "an intent to wrongfully
influence the recipient.68 If a defendant "intends" to bribe a foreign governmental official
in order to obtain or retain business, the corrupt nature of the act will be presumed.69
Further, as is the case with most other federal criminal statutes, one is not required to be
successful in the bribery attempt to have liability under the Act.70
Perhaps the most ambiguous aspect of the FCPA is the requisite intent needed to
constitute indirect bribery: an offense occurs if one makes a payment "while knowing" it
would subsequently be used to bribe a foreign official to obtain, retain or direct business.
Under the FCPA, the "knowing" standard of intent is fulfilled if: "(i) such person is aware
that such person is engaging in such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such
result is substantially certain to occur; or (ii) such person has a firm belief that such cir-
63.55 Fed. Reg. 28,694 (July 12, 1990).
64. Through October, 1993, the Attorney General had issued twenty-three (23) advisory opinions.
65.15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (e)(1) (issuers), 78dd-2 (f)(1) (domestic concerns) (1988).
66.Id.
67.15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (a) (issuers), 78dd-2(a) (domestic concerns) (1988).
68. S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., (1977); See H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., (1977);
See United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991) (the court upheld a jury instruc-
tion charging that an act is done corruptly under the FCPA if done voluntarily and intentionally,
and with a bad purpose to accomplish either an unlawful result or lawful result by unlawful
means).
69. See Liebo, 912 F.2d at 1312. Query whether one could ever bribe a foreign governmental official
to obtain business, but not do so "corruptly" with the meaning of the FCPA. Consider the fol-
lowing. A U.S. construction company contracts to construct a road in a foreign country for a
mining operation. The road will cross territory governed by a tribal chief hostile to the mining
operation. Without the chief's blessings, the construction company will undoubtedly face added
difficulties in constructing the road. When approached by the U.S. construction company, the
chief indicates that he desires to have a small road constructed to his village. The road will tra-
verse lands owned personally by the chief, and would obviously enhance the value of that prop-
erty. On the other hand, all of the inhabitants of the village will also benefit by having a better
means of transportation. If the construction company builds the village road, it is clear that it
has paid something of value to a foreign governmental official in order to obtain or retain busi-
ness. On the other hand, because the road will also bring great benefit to the entire village popu-
lation, it is questionable (and perhaps doubtful) that a federal prosecutor could make a case that
this payment was "corrupt".
70. H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., (1977).
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cumstance exists or that such result is substantially certain to occur.' 7 1 Under the FCPA
as originally enacted, a person committed an offense if a payment was made while
"knowing, or having reason to know" that the prohibited bribery actions would result
from the transaction. 72 Because the "reason to. know" standard proved to be unworkable
and vague, 7 3 the 1988 Amendments changed the intent standard to "knowing."
74
However, the exact meaning of the "knowing" standard has yet to be determined.
Many U.S. persons and businesses fail to appreciate the breadth of the "knowing"
standard. The "knowing" standard includes not only actual knowledge, but also intent
which, "while falling short of what the law terms 'positive knowledge; nevertheless evi-
dence[s] a conscious disregard or deliberate ignorance of known circumstances that
should reasonably alert one to the high probability of violations of the Act.' 75 By infer-
ring knowledge through a "high probability test,"76 Congress addressed what is known as
the "head in the sand" problem, in which companies are "willfully blind" 77 or deliberately
ignorant of warning signs of an illegal transaction in order to avoid acquiring the requi-
site knowledge. 78
The willful blindness standard is entrenched in U.S. criminal law.79 In fact, the willful
71.15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (f)(2)(A) (issuers), 78dd-2 (h)(3)(A) (domestic concerns) (1988). The
FCPA further states that when "knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is
required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability
of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstance
does not exist." 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (f)(2)(B) (issuers), 78dd-2 (h)(3)(B) (domestic concerns)
(1988).
72. The FCPA of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 103(a) (issuers), 104(a) (domestic concerns) (1977).
73. See, Roberts, note 61 supra (stating that the FCPA's "lack of clarity, which critics claim imposes
an unduly oppressive compliance burden on U.S. business" is partly to blame for its anticompet-
itive impact). See Gary M. Elden and Mark S. Sableman, Negligence Is Not Corruption: the
Scienter Requirement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV., 819 (1981)
(illustrating the confusion surrounding the meaning of intent under the FCPA with its analysis
of the various interpretations of the "reason to know" standard).
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (f)(2) (issuers), 78dd-2 (h)(3) (domestic concerns) (1988).
75. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1988).
76. The legislative history to the 1988 Amendment describes the "high probability" test in stating
that "knowledge of a fact may be inferred where the defendant has notice of the high probability
of the existence of the fact and has failed to establish an honest, contrary disbelief." H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess., (1988).
77. "A court can properly find willful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant
actually knew. He suspected the fact; he realized its probability; but he refrained from obtaining
the final confirmation because he wanted in the event to be able to deny knowledge. Glanville
Williams, Criminal Law § 57, at 159 (2d ed. 1961).
78. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess., (1988).
79. The willful blindness concept is no stranger to the judicial arena. See Jonathan L. Marcus, Model
Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102 Yale L. J. 2231, 2232 n.5 (1993) (for a list of
the cases which illustrate that all federal circuits have utilized the willful blindness doctrine). See
also Comment, Willful Blindness as a Substitute for Criminal Knowledge, 63 Iowa L. Rev.,466, 471
(1977) (stating that the doctrine of willful blindness, which originated in England, gained accep-
tance in the United States in the 1960s); See also J. Ll. J. Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of
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blindness concept has been incorporated into the Model Penal Code.8 0 The willful blind-
ness standard has been applied in numerous areas of criminal law. For example, laws mak-
ing it an offense to "knowingly" make false statements to government agencies, 8 1 or to
authorized firearms dealers for merchandise, 82 have not required actual knowledge.
Similarly, U.S. Courts of Appeals consistently have upheld jury instructions which state
that "a person who makes a statement with reckless disregard of the truthfulness of the
statement and with the conscious purpose to avoid learning the truthfulness of the state-
ment, is deemed to have knowledge of the statement and its truthfulness or lack thereof."
8 3
Courts also have not required prosecutors to prove that defendants had actual
knowledge in drug cases. United States v. Jewel18 4 is a drug transportation case which, as
the first Ninth Circuit case to comprehensively address willful blindness, is a leading
precedent for the doctrine. Jewell, the defendant, accepted a $100 offer from "Ray", a
stranger, to drive a car from Tijuana, Mexico across the border into the U.S. Jewell testi-
fied that although he accepted Ray's offer immediately after he refused Ray's attempt to
sell him marijuana, he was unaware of the presence of the drugs in the car which he
agreed to transport.8 5 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the inclu-
sion of the willful blindness doctrine in the jury instructions, stating that "deliberate
Note 79, continued
Knowledge, 17 Mod. Law Rev., 294, 298 (1954) (an English judicial authority states that "[flor
well-nigh a hundred years, it has been clear from the authorities that a person who deliberately
shuts his eyes to an obvious means of knowledge has sufficient mens rea for an offence based on
such words as ... "knowingly").
80. The "high probability test of the Model Penal Code states: "when knowledge of the existence of a
particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a
high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it did not exist." Model Penal
Code § 2.02(7) (Official Draft in 1962, Revised in 1985). The FCPA's legislative history follows
the "high probability" concept advocated in the Model Penal Code. In addition, the Model Penal
Code's description of the high probability test has been cited approvingly. See, e.g., United States
v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584, 587 (1975), which supports a "balanced" jury instruction that included
the high probability test in conjunction with "its negation by an actual belief of the non-exis-
tence of the fact" to determine when one has the requisite knowledge.
81.18 U.S.C.S. § 1001 (1979 & Supp. 1994).
82.18 U.S.C.S. § 922 (6) (1979).
83. United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978) (in
which the defendant appealed a conviction for fraudulent submission of Medicare claims); See
also United States v. Abrams, 427 F.2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970) (in
which a defendant-attorney contested an inference that he knowingly made false statements to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service on an affidavit relating to alien's application for an
extension of stay in the United States); See also United States v. Egenberg, 441 F.2d 441 (2nd Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971) (in which a certified public accountant was prosecuted
for knowingly submitting false statements on departing alien income tax returns and for paying
bribes to tax technicians who reviewed his returns). For cases regarding the illegal acquisition of
firearms, see, e.g. United States v. Wright, 537 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir., 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924
(1976); United States v. Thomas, 484 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912 (1973).
84.532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
85. Id. at 698-99.
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ignorance and positive knowledge are equally culpable."86 The Jewell instruction has been
followed in subsequent controlled substance cases in other circuits: it has been "common-
ly used" in the Second Circuit,87 and the Seventh Circuit has stated that the instruction is
appropriate "when it addresses an issue reasonably raised by the evidence:' 88 However,
the Ninth89 and Tenth 90 Circuits have limited the situations in which the Jewell instruc-
tion can be used. Whether the Jewell instruction is "commonly" 9 1 or "sparingly" 92 used,
the case law illustrates that "[c] onstruing 'knowingly' in a criminal statute to include will-
ful blindness to the existence of a fact is no radical concept in the law."93
The willful blindness concept does not mean that a U.S. person or entity will be auto-
matically liable for all bribes of foreign governmental officials that occur indirectly. For
example, it is unlikely that either recklessness or negligence alone would infer the requisite
degree of knowledge for liability under the FCPA.94 Academics have noted the need for
86. Id. at 700. But see, the dissenting opinion in Jewell, which was written by Judge Anthony M. Ken-
nedy (now Justice Kennedy). Judge Kennedy stated that a problem with the willful blindness doc-
trine is its "uncertain[ty] in scope": "[t]here is disagreement as to whether reckless disregard for
the existence of a fact constitutes willful blindness or some lesser degree of culpability:' Id. at 706.
87. United States v. Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1993) (in deciding whether a "conscious
avoidance" instruction is merited, "precise consideration" is given to the content of the instruc-
tion, making it clear to jurors that knowledge is to be inferred "only when persuaded beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and
consciously avoided confirming that fact"). See United States v. Fletcher, 928 F.2d 495, 502, cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 67 (1991).
88. United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 1988). See United States v. Anzoulatos, 962 F.2d
720 (7th Cir. 1992) (where the Court of Appeals upheld jury instructions based on the Jewell
reasoning in determining whether a car salesman knowingly violated a money laundering
statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (a)(1)(B) when selling vehicles to drug dealers with car titles which
were not in the buyers names).
89. See United States v. Sanchez-Robles, 927 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 1991), which states that the
Jewell instruction should not be used when there is either actual knowledge, or when there are
"no suspicious circumstances surrounding the activity beyond direct evidence of the illegality
itself?' Sanchez-Robles referred to United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1982) to illus-
trate a circumstance where the defendant lacked knowledge of the illegal activity, thus making
the Jewell instruction inappropriate: because the defendant voluntarily disclosed the contents of
a package of cocaine to an undercover agent, and thus did not show any evidence of willful
blindness to the contents, the deliberate ignorance instruction was not used.
90. See United States v. Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 248-49 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating that the
"willful blindness" instruction is inappropriate if the evidence points "solely to direct knowledge
of criminal venture").
91. See Rodriguez, 983 F.2d at 457.
92. See Sanchez-Robles, 927 F.2d at 1073.
93.United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 881 (2nd Cir. 1972).
94. A logical inference from the 1988 amendments' increase in the standard of intent to "knowing"
from "reason to know" is that a reckless failure to investigate a situation would not constitute an
offense under the FCPA. This interpretation is also supported by the Conference Committee's
decision not to adopt the proposal set forth by the House of Representatives to include "reckless
disregard" as an incriminating standard of intent. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d.
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parameters on the willful blindness doctrine. Otherwise, a significant erosion of the know-
ing standard likely will occur "leaving it essentially synonymous with the 'reason to know'
or 'mere negligence standards."' 95 For the FCPA defendant, the problem with the willful
blindness concept is, however, that the underlying offer to pay or the actual payment to a
foreign governmental official to receive or retain business is intentional. The only question
on the indirect front is whether the requisite intent filters up the hierarchy to taint a per-
son liable under the FCPA - a U.S. citizen, resident or domestic concern.
To further exacerbate the uncertainty surrounding the standard of intent, the legisla-
tive history to the 1988 amendment regarding the intent standard suggests that a court
should, when construing whether willful blindness exists in a particular case, bifurcate the
intent standard by applying "the appropriate 'mix' of subjective and objective standards
implied in such a carefully structured test.96 There are no published decisions applying a
willful blindness test in a FCPA case which appears to be due to the fact that no indirect
violations of the FCPA have been prosecuted. 97 Thus, the weight which a court will
instruct a jury to place on objective facts, as opposed to the subjective issue of what one
actually believed, is far from conclusive. In the meantime, companies are left to battle fac-
tual situations which could be viewed objectively in hindsight. As a result, they must put
policies and procedures in place to avoid illegal payments being made directly or indirect-
ly to foreign governmental officials in the first instance, and if such a payment does occur,
to perhaps mitigate any inference that they did have the requisite intent.
Note 94, continued
Sess., (1988). Furthermore, this explanation of the knowing standard has been used in other
areas of the law. See United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584, 588 (2d Cir. 1975) (in which a lower
court's conviction for mail fraud was reversed and remanded because the jury was instructed
that requisite knowledge was satisfied if the defendant acted either with "reckless disregard" or
with a "conscious effort to avoid learning the truth"; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit concluded that the jury instruction should have stated the elements of knowledge in the
conjunctive, and not in the disjunctive, in order to explain that mere foolishness was insufficient
to meet the knowledge standard). See United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 287 (2d Cir., 1973),
cert denied sub nom Lavelle v. United States, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (in deciding whether a defen-
dant knew treasury bills in his possession were stolen, the court stated that "guilty knowledge
cannot be established by demonstrating mere negligence or even foolishness").
95. Roberts, note 61 supra at 503 n.57 (citing to Comment, Willful Blindness as a Substitute for
Criminal Knowledge, 63 Iowa L. Rev. 466, 471 (1977), which noted that the increased use of the
willful blindness doctrine in drug abuse cases to ease "the prosecutorial burden of proving the
essential element of knowledge" could compromise the knowing requirement).
96.An "objective standard" is used in determining whether the circumstances alerted one to a "high
probability" that one would violate the Act. Whereas, in inferring whether one actually believed
a violation would result, a "subjective standard" is used. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 536, 100th Cong.,
2d. Sess., (1988), at 374. See Roberts, supra note 61., at 502.
97. But see, U.S. v. Harris Corporation, No. CR 90-0456 CAL (N.D. Cal. filed August 31, 1990) in
which the government alleged as an overt act in an FCPA indictment that one co-defendant, a
consultant, had told another co-defendant that he (the consultant) had "an in" with the
Government of Colombia and that the co-defendant would "have to look the other way" with
respect to payments to Colombian officials.
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III. Is Due Diligence Necessary?
Another ambiguous aspect of the FCPA is whether there is a due diligence defense to
FCPA violations which would allow a company to claim that a conviction is not warrant-
ed because it had established a comprehensive compliance policy to prevent violations of
the FCPA. An analysis limited to the statutory language and legislative history of the
FCPA leads one to conclude that a court would find a due diligence defense irrelevant,
and thus would not allow evidence of due diligence to be introduced at trial. The text of
the FCPA does not address or establish a due diligence defense. Furthermore, Congress
considered and rejected this concept while devising the FCPA's 1988 amendments. 98
Despite the omission of the due diligence defense from the FCPA, companies should
not assume that the exercise of due diligence, including the adoption of policies and pro-
cedures designed to avoid FCPA liability, is not relevant. First, it appears that in a situa-
tion involving the payment of a bribe by a non-management level employee or third
party, that due diligence and policies and procedures would mitigate entity liability if
properly designed and followed within a company.99 By showing that the alleged actions
were against company policy and procedures, corporate intent becomes more difficult to
infer.100 Second, and equally as important, a well-developed program reduces the chances
for FCPA violations to occur in the first instance, and thus alleviates the likelihood for a
company to be held vicariously liable.
A preventative policy is particularly compelling with respect to violations which
occur as a result of payments by agents and other third parties. An effective policy pre-
scribes procedures for a company to follow in hiring agents and other third parties, incor-
porates an educational program to inform them of the FCPA and its ramifications, and
includes procedures for insuring that the policy is not only implemented, but is also
respected and followed. 1 1 In fact, it is difficult to imagine a U.S. company routinely
doing business through foreign agents, representatives and other third parties without
having an effective FCPA policy in place. If a company has an effective policy in place, it is
arguable that the company could not have had the requisite intent needed to violate the
FCPA, assuming, of course, that the policy is designed also to avoid willful blindness situ-
ations. On the other hand, due diligence cuts both ways. If the company has a policy in
place, but is consciously ignorant of matters brought to its attention, the FCPA policy
might prove the prosecutor's case in that given the objective factors coupled with the
company's policy, the company should have known that FCPA payments would occur.
A strong, effective FCPA policy also might play a protective role. Although the case
98. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess., (1988). The House Committee's proposal, which
was rejected, had prescribed a "safe harbor" defense for FCPA violations in which a company
would not be liable for FCPA violations by its employees or agents "if it had established proce-
dures "reasonably expected to prevent and detect violations." Id.
99. For a differing opinion, see Seth Maxwell, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other Arguments
Against a Due Diligence Defense to Corporate Criminal Liability, 29 UCLA L. Rev., 447, 482-83
(1982), which used case law and legal theories to disprove the due diligence defense.
100. See Kep Schlegal, Just Desserts For Corporate Criminals, at 85 (1990) (stating that a showing
of due diligence should remove corporate intent causing "the individual actor, and not the cor-
poration itself, [to] be the party subject to blame").
101. See Section V below for the application of a FCPA Policy.
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law on the FCPA is limited, the cases which the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) 102 have prosecuted have involved egregious
FCPA violations. 103 As a result, in many of these cases the defendants have entered into
consent decrees and pleaded guilty without a trial. 104 One could infer that, perhaps feder-
al prosecutors exercise prosecutorial constraint in pursuing non-egregious FCPA cases, in
particular those cases involving indirect situations. On the other hand, the paucity of
FCPA actions might be driven by other factors. In the typical fact pattern, most of the
criminal activity occurs outside of the United States. Thus, prosecutors face the obstacles
inherent in prosecuting an extraterritorial case. These include the formidable task of
obtaining the cooperation of foreign officials in order to prove a case, and discovering
information which often is located overseas. Because of the burdens involved, prosecutors
may be pursuing a wise policy of focusing on those FCPA cases where the intent to violate
the FCPA is more apparent and the wrongful conduct more flagrant.
Due diligence implemented through an enforcement policy is also a factor in calcu-
lating the sentence for a convicted company. If a company has established "an effective
program to prevent and detect violations of law" the Federal Sentencing Guidelines pro-
vide for the subtraction of three points from the culpability scale which determines the
severity of a sentence. 10 5 Thus, even if evidence of due diligence procedures are not
admissible in the trial of a FCPA case, this evidence is clearly relevant in sentencing.
Evidence of due diligence also might be relevant for other purposes. The current
prosecutorial approach of charging defendants with every imaginable offense within the
102. Responsibility for bringing civil and criminal suits for violations of the antibribery provisions
is shared between the SEC and the DOJ. The SEC is responsible for actions against issuers
while the DOJ has jurisdiction over domestic concerns. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff, 78dd-2 (g)(1).
Although the SEC investigates criminal actions against issuers, generally the DOJ is in charge
of prosecuting the criminal cases. See Notes, Robert S. Levy, The Antibribery Provisions of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: Are They as Valuable as We Think? 10 Del. J. Corp. L. 71,
77 (1985) (citing 452 Sec Reg. L. & Rep. (BNA) A-3 (1978)). Finally, the SEC has jurisdiction
over both the civil and criminal actions for violating the FCPA's accounting provisions. 15
U.S.C. § 78m(b).
103. See, e.g., Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction, United States v. Carver (S.D. Fla. entered
Apr. 9, 1979), reprinted in 2 FCPA Rep. at 647 (Dec. 31, 1982) (in which a $1,500,000 payment
was directly made to the Director of Petroleum Affairs of Quatar to obtain a drilling conces-
sion from Quatar's government; the transaction was not difficult to prove because the defen-
dants contacted the United States Ambassador to Quatar for assistance in renegotiating the
concession).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Silicon Contractors, Inc., Criminal No. 85-251 (E.D. La., June 27,
1985) (in which Silicon agreed to a permanent injunction and to a $150,000 fine in settling
criminal charges for participating in the bribery of Mexican officials to gain a contract).
105. 18 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 8C2.5 (f) (1994). An exception is made for the culpability scale reduction
if the offense was committed or condoned by "an individual within high-level personnel of the
organization, a person within high-level personnel of the unit of the organization within
which the offense was committed where the unit had 200 or more employees, or an individual
responsible for the administration or enforcement of a program to prevent and detect viola-
tions of law." Id.
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scope of the defendant's alleged conduct also is prevalent in the FCPA area. A U.S.
exporter or importer, who takes part in a fraud against a foreign government by means of
an illegal payment to a foreign official, is in violation of federal laws regarding the making
of reports and statements to the U.S. government. 106 Potentially, foreign bribery also can
be prosecuted under federal statutes which prohibit fraud through the use of the United
States mail or wire communications, as well as under the antitrust laws. 107 In addition,
foreign bribery can be prosecuted under the Travel Act, 108 which prohibits the travel or
use of an instrumentality in interstate commerce with the intent to perform an unlawful
activity. 109 Finally, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 110
with its formidable 20 year maximum prison sentence, can also be invoked to prosecute a
company for foreign bribery."I'
In a given case, a prosecutor might be compelled to prosecute the offenders under
other criminal statutes. For example, violations of other statutes might be easier to prove
than a violation of the FCPA. Evidence needed to prove other criminal violations might
be available in the United States, while the evidence necessary to obtain a FCPA convic-
tion could be unattainable in a foreign country. As these other statutes likely will require
different elements to constitute an offense, a court might allow into evidence a company's
due diligence standards and procedures with respect to the intent standard.
IV FCPA Policy and Procedures
The implementation of FCPA policies and procedures for a due diligence program
should be tailored to fit the needs of each company or business. On one end of the spec-
trum, a very small trading company can adopt a basic statement that it follows the FCPA,
and incorporate simple FCPA representations in its agreements as appropriate. In con-
trast, a diversified multinational with offices in several countries is required to take a dif-
ferent approach. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines set forth standards to determine
what constitutes an effective compliance program, recognizing that an effective program
will vary from company to company.112 Among the factors to take into consideration in
106. Baruch, note 20 supra at 76-78 (referring to four statutes used by the DOJ to prosecute false
statements and reports, including 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which prohibits "false official statements"
See, e.g., Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308 (1991) (where Liebo appealed convictions for making a false
statement to a government agency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1000 in addition to appealing his
conviction for violating the bribery provisions of the FCPA).
107. Baruch, note 20 supra at 49 (citing to the mail and wire fraud statues, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343,
and to antitrust laws under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.
108. 18 U.S.C.§ 1952.
109. Baruch, note 20 supra at 57.
110. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1991).
111. Baruch, note 20 supra at 54. See U.S. v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 334 (D. Conn.,
1990) (illustrating that the government does not necessarily pursue the crimes most directly
connected to the alleged actions, the U.S. District Court of Connecticut upheld an indictment
which did not charge defendants with substantive violations of the FCPA but instead used
alleged FCPA violations as a basis for violating the Travel Act; the violations of the Travel Act
then functioned as predicates for charges of thirty-three RICO offenses).
112. 18 U.S.C.S.Appx. § 8A1.2 cmt. (k) (1994).
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designing a program are: (i) the size of the organization; (ii) the likelihood that certain
offenses may occur because of the nature of its business; and (iii) the prior history of the
organization. 113
The FCPA policy must not only include an appropriate policy standard, but also
implement, monitor and enforce its program. 1 14 At a minimum, the FCPA policy must
incorporate compliance standards and procedures which are "reasonably capable of
reducing the prospect of criminal conduct." 115 In other words, a company must design
and implement its compliance program in such a manner that the program effectively
self-polices the organization. Further, given the standard of intent under the FCPA, the
program must be designed to take into account the willful blindness concept. A multina-
tional might incorporate the FCPA procedures into broader business ethics, insider trad-
ing, antitrust or anti-boycott rules programs. An effective compliance program would
include the following elements.
A. THE FCPA PoLicY STATEMENT
The FCPA policy statement is the cornerstone of a FCPA compliance program. The
policy statement should, of course, affirm that it is the company's position that its busi-
ness activities are conducted in compliance with the FCPA. The policy statement should
explain the FCPA in layman's terms. The draftsman must keep in mind that the compa-
ny's employees will rely upon this explanation.
The policy should incorporate procedures for compliance with the FCPA. For exam-
ple, the policy should include procedures for due diligence with respect to prospective
partnerships and joint ventures, and the parties who have a financial interest in those
entities. Other issues the policy should address include gifts given and payments made by
the company and its employees, political contributions made by the company's employees
or its advisors, and the proper documentation for reimbursement of out-of-pocket
expenses and costs incurred with respect to foreign-related business.
For virtually any company engaged in international business, an effective policy must
include procedures to govern the appointment of and relationship with agents, represen-
tatives, consultants, advisors, "go betweens" and other third parties. At the outset of any
relationship with these third parties, the company first must ascertain with whom it is
dealing. 116 A comprehensive due diligence review must be made prior to entering into
each new relationship. In addition, the policy should require that all contracts with third
parties include provisions regarding FCPA compliance.
Issuers must also develop and implement a policy to assure accounting records are
accurately maintained. The accounting controls require accurate recordkeeping in order
to prevent and detect FCPA violations which might be manifest in the form of slush
funds, off-book accounts or through the improper classification of expenses. In order to
insure that the corporate transactions are accurately recorded, a company should take
steps to document all expenditures through means such as receipts, invoices, checks, or
statements. Furthermore, it is wise to implement a policy which requires at least two
113. Id.
114. 18 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 8A1.2 cmt. (k) (1994).
115. 18 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 8A1.2 cmt. (k)(1) (1994).
116. See Lockheed Faces Possible Action by Air Force, Wall St. J., June 24, 1994, A12.
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management personnel to approve all major expenditures and to confirm that they are
recorded correctly.
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY
A company not only must adopt an appropriate policy for its businesses, but also
should confirm that the policy is properly implemented. Implementation consists of several
components. First, the company must insure that the employees are aware of the policy. The
company should adopt a means of disseminating the policy to its employees. Second, the
company must assign a high level employee to oversee the implementation of the policy.117
Third, the company must communicate the policy to the employees. 118 Commu-
nication can occur in many different ways. The company can hold training sessions to
explain the FCPA policy and compliance program, and to give employees ample opportu-
nity to ask questions. These training sessions could effectively use videos and hypothetical
situations to illustrate the policy. Agents, representatives and other third parties with
whom the company does business also could be required to participate in these training
sessions. Similarly, the company can publish brochures and other explanatory materials
on the policy. After the policy has been disseminated and explained, the company should
obtain a statement from each employee certifying that he or she has reviewed and under-
stands the policy.
Fourth, the company should consider participating in industry associations which
address business ethics and FCPA issues, and which assist members in self-governing
their FCPA compliance. One example of an industry which has effectively implemented a
business ethics policy to address the FCPA is the defense industry. The Defense Industry
Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct was formed in 1986, and since that time it has
been very active in defining, adopting, implementing and monitoring ethics and FCPA
standards for the defense industry."19
Perhaps the most important implementation aspect of a FCPA policy is that it should
become a part of the culture of the company. Lower level employees and third parties will
deem a FCPA policy important only if they know that their superiors place a high degree
of importance on compliance with the policy.
C. MONITORING COMPLIANCE
Under a self-policing approach to the FCPA, a company must take reasonable steps
to achieve compliance with its policy. 120 Effective monitoring includes implementing sys-
tems designed to detect violations of the FCPA and implementing procedures for report-
ing and investigating suspected violations.
Systems designed to detect violations might include an annual certification program
whereby those employees and third parties engaged in the international aspects of the
company's business must participate. This certification program could require that the
employees and third parties answer a questionnaire as to their activities for the previous
117. 18 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 8A1.2 cmt. (k)(2), (k)(3) (1994).
118. 18 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 8A1.2 cmt. (k)(4) (1994).
119. 1993 Annual Report to the Public and the Defense Industry, Defense Industry Initiative on
Business Ethics and Conduct.
120. 18 U.S.C.S.Appx. § 8AI.2 cmt. (k)(5) (1994).
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year, and certify that they have not violated the FCPA. In certain situations, the certifica-
tion procedure alone will not be sufficient. Instead, in areas of sensitivity or in situations in
which the company might question whether the employee or third party would complete
the questionnaire and certification in a frank and candid manner, the company should
consider having a high level employee interview those employees and third parties. In such
cases, the company should adopt a guideline for questions for the interviewer to ask.
A successful monitoring program must include a means by which employees and
third parties may discuss areas of concern and report suspected violations with high-level
management and legal counsel.' 2 1 In a larger company, the avenue of reporting would
most likely take the form of a "hotline" or other confidential telephone lines through
which employees can leave messages to report their concerns. Given the sensitive nature of
FCPA issues, companies should secure telephone answering machines and voice mail sys-
tems used for reporting concerns, and assign the employee and/or inquiry a code name to
be used in all communications regarding a reported situation. The company also should
determine how its legal counsel should interact with the monitoring program. 122 In fact, it
might consider requiring that all inquires be made directly to its legal counsel.
A FCPA compliance program is not complete unless it provides for disciplinary
action to be taken against those employees and third parties who violate its FCPA poli-
cy.12 3 Determining the appropriate discipline and sanctions for an employee is wise for
reasons other than the criminal liability aspect of the FCPA. If the egregious act actually
has occurred, the company must address the question of whether it should disclose the
conduct to the government. The FCPA does not contain any affirmative duty to disclose
violations to the government; therefore, failure to disclose an offense should not result in
further criminal liability to either the company or any U.S. person who may have com-
mitted an offense. However, there may be other considerations. For example, under the
Sentencing Guidelines voluntary disclosure of a criminal act is a mitigating factor for a
court to consider when imposing a sentence. 124
121. Id.
122. In any event, the company must take steps to preserve the attorney-client privilege with
respect to all communications with its legal counsel in order to avoid discovery. If corporate
counsel needs information from company employees in order to inquire whether a breach in
corporate policy has occurred, the purpose of counsel conducting an investigation into actions
which might have legal implications should be made clear to the employees. Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 499 U.S. 383 (1981) (the Supreme Court extended the attorney-client privilege
to communications between Upjohn Co. employees and in-house counsel in order to deter-
mine the nature and extent of questionable payments made by Upjohn's subsidiaries to foreign
government officials). The attorney-client privilege exists with middle and lower-level employ-
ees, in addition to the high-level management who are actually liable, because the "privilege
exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also
the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound informed advice' Id. at
390. Although the communications are not discoverable, the attorney-client privilege does not
extend to facts. Id. at 395.
123. 18 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 8A1.2 cmt. (k)(6) (1994).
124. A company can decrease its culpability score by five (5) points if it reports the offense to the
proper governmental authorities in a timely manner, as well as cooperates with government inves-
tigations and affirmatively accepts responsibility for its actions. 18 U.S.C.S. § 8C2.5 (g)(1) (1994).
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As a final component of a FCPA program, a company should consider installing an
audit or self governance committee to oversee the implementation and operation of the
program. 125 This committee should be charged with the responsibility for insuring that
necessary systemic changes are made to the FCPA program to respond to problems the
company encounters in the FCPA area.
V A FCPA Compliance Program in the Real World
The FCPA prohibitions are fairly simple. The difficulty U.S. companies encounter is in
applying its prohibitions to the real world scenarios which arise in their day-to-day busi-
ness activities. The U.S. company must exercise constant vigilance in ensuring that its poli-
cies and procedures are adequate for its operations and that these programs are consistent-
ly followed. Consider the following hypothetical situations involving U.S. companies. 1
26
A. THE THIRD PARTY RELATIONSHIP WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
Acme Tool, a U.S. company, manufacturers printing presses. To sell its presses interna-
tionally, it utilizes agents, distributors and representatives. Before retaining any agents, dis-
tributors or representatives, Acme Tool conducts extensive due diligence on the companies
and individuals involved. 127 Several years ago, Acme Tool retained Atco, a company in the
country of Atlantis, to act as its distributor in Atlantis. Prior to retaining Atco, Acme Tool
conducted its usual due diligence on Atco's background and qualifications. Atco is incor-
porated under the laws of Atlantis, and is wholly-owned by Atlantis nationals. No Atco
employees or officers are U.S. citizens or residents. Atco is well respected in Atlantis, and it
is widely known that Atco is one of the most effective distributors in selling to the Atlantis
government. In fact, Atco represents several U.S. companies which sell to the Atlantis gov-
ernment. It has now come to Acme Tool's attention that Atco has, over the years, increased
its margins on the presses sold to the Atlantis government. Atco's mark-up is fifty-percent
(50%) of the price at which Acme Tool sells to Atco while Acme Tool's gross profit margin
on the presses is five percent (5%). Moreover, Acme Tool also knows that Atco's mark-up
on sales to private companies in Atlantis is only ten percent (10%).
Should Acme Tool be concerned about Atco's high mark-up on sales to the Atlantis
government? The hallmarks which make a third party effective are also the factors which
raise FCPA questions. The agent, representative or other third party may have close rela-
tionships with governmental officials, including family relationships. The agent, represen-
tative or other third party may make large profits on its transactions with the govern-
ment, leading to questions regarding the nature of the relationship.
One might question whether Acme Tool would have FCPA liability since it does not
have actual knowledge of any illicit payments; however, as discussed above, actual knowl-
125. 18 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 8A1.2 cmt. (k)(7) (1994).
126. The following hypotheticals are not intended to reflect or depict any specific actual factual sit-
uations. Any similarity of the hypotheticals to persons, businesses or governments is merely
coincidental.
127. In conducting its due diligence, Acme Tool addresses the "red flags" for relationships with
agents and other third parties. Red flags are warning signs which should alert a company to the
possibility that FCPA violations are or may be occurring. 1 FCPA Rep. at 100.06 (July 1991).
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edge is not required for FCPA liability.128 Is knowledge of high profits made on govern-
mental transactions enough to cause Acme Tool to be on notice of a "high probability"
that Atco is making payments to foreign governmental officials by selling the presses at
inflated prices? Answers to these factual questions are rarely clear. Under the FCPA, Acme
Tool would most likely be required to undertake some level of review and investigation of
the situation. To preserve attorney-client privilege, this investigation should be conducted
by its legal counsel. 129 The scope of the inquiry should depend upon the information
uncovered as the investigation unfolds.
Because of the factual nature of FCPA issues, it is virtually impossible to develop a
check list of factors counsel should review in conducting an investigation. In this situa-
tion, however, counsel should begin with an analysis of the economics of the transactions.
Are there any independent factors which would explain the higher mark-up? For exam-
ple, is Atco performing services incidental to the sale to the government which it does not
perform for its commercial customers? Are the presses sold to the government the same
models, with the same performance guarantees and warranties as those sold commercial-
ly? Is Atco modifying the printing presses sold to the government, for example, by adding
security equipment? What is the method of selling to the Atlantis government (by open
tenders or a private bid process)?
Another area of inquiry should revolve around relationships.130 Has Atco's relation-
ship with the Atlantis government changed? More specifically, is Atco's relationship with
those branches through which the printing presses are sold different than it was when
Acme Tool conducted its due diligence? Have new governmental officials taken office who
are more favorably disposed to Atco. If so, do those governmental officials have special
relationships with Atco? What is the nature and basis for those relationships?
At the outset of its relationship with Atco, Acme Tool might have anticipated this situ-
ation and taken steps to avoid FCPA liability. First, as a basic proposition Acme Tool
should have incorporated into its agreement with Atco an affirmation that Atco would
comply with the FCPA. While Atco is not itself subject to the FCPA, Acme Tool is subject
to the Act. Thus, Acme Tool must protect itself against indirect FCPA violations occurring
through Atco's actions. Second, the agreement should also have contained representations
128. See Section II of the text for a discussion of the intent standard.
129. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 499 U.S. 383 (1981). See note 122 and accompanying text.
130. Recognizing the danger in hiring a foreign firm or foreign agent with a special relationship to
the foreign government, a number of companies have requested advisory opinions from the
Attorney General. See, e.g., Department of Justice Review Procedure Release, No. 84-1, August
16, 1984 printed in 3 FCPA Rep. 721. An American firm requested an advisory opinion where
it sought to hire a foreign firm as a marketing representative. The principals of this company
were related to the head of state of the foreign government, and one principal personally man-
aged the private affairs and business matters for the head of state. The American firm secured
representations from the marketing representative concerning violations of the FCPA. After
reviewing the facts and the due diligence procedures of the American firm, the Attorney
General stated that no enforcement action would be taken. See, e.g., Department of Justice
Review Procedure Release, No. 85-2, January 1987 printed in 3 FCPA Rep. 722.01. An American
business wanted to hire a foreign agent who had previously held an official position in the for-
eign government, provided that written representations would be made regarding the FCPA.
The Attorney General stated that no actions against the American company would be taken.
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as to Acme Tool's ownership, and an affirmative requirement that Atco notify Acme Tool
should changes occur in Atco's direct or indirect ownership. Third, Acme should have
included provisions in the agreement requiring Atco to provide annual certifications with
respect to its FCPA compliance. Fourth, the agreement should have provided Acme Tool
with the right to audit Atco's books and records in order to confirm compliance with the
FCPA. Thus, in this case, if Acme Tool's legal counsel were not able to conclude early in the
investigations that no FCPA violations had occurred, Acme Tool should have a right under
its agreement with Atco to request an audit of Atco's books and records.
B. THE JoiNT VENTURE RELATIONSHIP
SmithCo, a U.S. steel tubing manufacturer, wishes to develop a distribution network
in Rogaria. SmithCo has contacted Roco, a distributor of specialty metals in Rogaria, to
discuss the possibility of distributing the SmithCo steel tubes in that country. Roco is
unwilling to act as SmithCo's distributor in Rogaria because it does not wish to make
substantial investments in the specialized handling equipment and inventory which it
would be required to purchase. SmithCo and Roco instead decide to form a 50-50 joint
venture through which they will distribute tubes in Rogaria. The primary purchaser of
the SmithCo tubing will be the Rogarian state-owned power company. The joint venture
will be operated through JointCo, a jointly-owned Rogarian company. Although the
Rogarian power company purchases of SmithCo tubes could be very substantial, SmithCo
is concerned about the FCPA because Rogaria is a country with a reputation for corrup-
tion, particularly in purchases by state-owned companies. While anxious for the business,
SmithCo wants to insure that it does not have liability under the FCPA.
Since the primary customer for the steel tubes is a state-owned company, questions
involving the FCPA are raised. 131 Although a foreign wholly or partially owned subsidiary
generally is not subject to the FCPA, and a parent company can not have vicarious liability
for a subsidiary's violations, the exposure for SmithCo is one of indirect liability.132 Thus,
as a basic proposition, SmithCo must ensure that JointCo adopts and implements a FCPA
compliance policy. The only question is the scope and nature of that policy.
131. Although the Department of Justice has issued an advisory opinion concerning an American
company's relationship with a government-owned business, the questions of to what extent
state-owned companies are subject to the FCPA remain unanswered. The advisory opinion on
this issue addressed an American company's relationship with a government-owned business
in a country where, in order to conduct business with the military, all foreign suppliers had to
contract with that government-owned business. According to the foreign country's rules, the
American company had to pay the government-owned company a percentage of the total con-
tract price of the defense equipment sold. The American company represented to the Attorney
General that, in order to avoid making a payment to a foreign official or government-owned
business, it would pay the commissions directly to the country's treasury or would deduct the
commission from the total purchase price. The Attorney General stated that no enforcement
action would be taken. Department of Justice Review Procedure Release, No. 93-2, May 11, 1993
printed in 3 FCPA Rep. 727. Since in many countries state-owned companies are intertwined
with the government, for planning purposes one must assume, as did the American company
in the advisory opinion, that state-owned companies are fully subject to the FCPA.
132. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
Spring 1995 27
As is the case in many FCPA situations, the difficulties arise in the details. SmithCo
probably will not encounter much resistance from Roco to its position that JointCo adopt
and implement a FCPA policy and procedures. 133 In fact, as is the case in most joint ven-
tures, it is not the joint venture entity which causes the major FCPA concern for the U.S.
venturer. For example, SmithCo should have access to JointCo's books and records. Thus,
it would not be required to insist upon any special audit rights with respect to JointCo
vis-a-vis the FCPA. Furthermore, as an owner of JointCo, SmithCo should exercise a cer-
tain degree of control over JointCo.
The problem encountered in foreign joint ventures is the extent to which the FCPA
policy extends to the foreign joint venturer or venturers. From one viewpoint, the FCPA
does not apply to the actions of an entity which is not a domestic concern. However, a
U.S. company can not hide behind the guise of a joint venture relationship to shield itself
from actions undertaken by its foreign co-venturer. For example, if JointCo receives busi-
ness because of Roco's illegal payments to officials of the state-owned power company,
SmithCo would have liability under the FCPA if it can be shown that SmithCo is substan-
tially certain that Roco would make the illegal payments. The prosecutor would not be
required to prove that JointCo itself made the illegal payments. Instead, a prosecutor
would only be required to show that Roco made the payments and SmithCo had reason
to know that the payments would be made. Both SmithCo and Roco would be beneficia-
ries of the illegal payments through their ownership of JointCo.
How does SmithCo, a law abiding U.S. company, protect itself in this situation?
Given the standard of intent under the FCPA, it would appear that SmithCo would be
required to not only conduct extensive due diligence with respect to Roco, but also to
insist that Roco adopt a FCPA policy. SmithCo should also insist that Roco represent and
warrant that it does not, and will not violate the FCPA. In addition, SmithCo should
require Roco to provide periodic certifications as to its compliance with the FCPA.
SmithCo should also require Roco to make available its books and records to SmithCo for
audit to confirm compliance with the FCPA.
What course of action is SmithCo required to take if it discovers that Roco has paid
bribes to Rogarian officials in its activities unrelated to JointCo's business? Once SmithCo
has knowledge of Roco's payment of bribes in Roco's activities unrelated to JointCo's
business, does SmithCo have "automatic" FCPA liability if it should later be discovered
that Roco has made illegal payments with respect to Jointco's business? At what point is
SmithCo required to divest itself of its interest in JointCo?
C. THE BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CASE
John's BioTech, based in the U.S., has developed a bacteria agent which is used to clean
municipal waste systems. John's BioTech has approached the Catina government about the
possibility of selling its product for use in the country's waste systems. A Catina govern-
133. See Department of Justice Review Procedure Release, No. 86-1, July 18, 1986 printed in 3 FCPA
Rep. 723 (in which the Attorney General did not object to an American company entering into
a joint venture relationship with a foreign venturer who was a member of the British parlia-
ment (MP) but held no position within the British government; the MP agreed to make full
disclosure of his relationship with the U.S. corporation, and agreed not to participate in any
legislative votes nor use its influence in order to benefit the corporation).
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mental official has said that the Catina government is interested in the product, and
because of the poor condition of the country's waste disposal systems, it anticipates plac-
ing a large order. However, the governmental official said that all orders must be placed
through an import agent, CatCo, a corporation based in the Isle of Man. When John's
BioTech contacted CatCo at its office in London, CatCo agreed to include the bacterial
agent in the products it offers to the Catina government, but only if it receives a sales com-
mission of forty percent (40%). Since John's BioTech has a similar commission agency
relationship with a company in another country to whom it pays a five percent (5%) com-
mission, John's BioTech objected to the high commission requested by CatCo. In response,
CatCo says that John's BioTech can simply add its commission to the selling price of the
product. In conducting its due diligence on CatCo, John's BioTech learns that CatCo is
wholly-owned by the 1994 Prosperity Trust, a trust formed under the laws of Jersey.
To what extent is a U.S. company required to ascertain with whom it is dealing? What
result should occur when the U.S. company cannot ascertain the ownership of a foreign
entity? For example, if John's BioTech contacts the trustee of the 1994 Prosperity Trust
directly, it almost certainly will be told by the trustee that banking and other laws prohibit
the disclosure of such information. Has John's BioTech satisfied its obligations under the
FCPA by having made the inquiry in the light of the high commission being paid by
CatCo and the apparent willingness of the Catina government to pay the commission?
To what degree is John's BioTech required to inquire about beneficial ownership and
direct and indirect relationships? For example, assume that CatCo discloses to John's
BioTech that the beneficiaries of the 1994 Prosperity Trust are all of the members of the
Kesu tribe and their descendants. Upon further investigation, John's BioTech learns that the
Kesu tribe is a small tribe in the country of Catina, and that a majority of the Catina ruling
party, including the governmental official who referred John's BioTech to CatCo, are mem-
bers of this tube. What action should John's BioTech take at this point? Is John's BioTech
required to walk away from this transaction on the basis that Catina governmental officials
could potentially receive an economic benefit from the commissions? Is it sufficient for
John's BioTech to receive a representation from the trustee that no Catina governmental
officials or their relatives would receive any distributions under the trust? Must John's
BioTech go further and require that the trustee disclose how distributions would be made
under the trust pursuant to a letter of wishes or other instruments? What result if under the
trust (or a letter of wishes) the class of beneficiaries may later be changed or narrowed?
D. THE UNEXPLAINED PAYMENT CASE
PetroTina, an Asian company, owns a chemical facility which it wishes to sell to a
purchaser who will disassemble the plant and move it to another site. Harry Jones, an
unemployed U.S. chemical engineer has learned through a trade journal that the equip-
ment is being offered for sale. Mr. Jones' friend, George Rodriquez, is a native of Devania
who has been able to convince the Devania government to purchase the chemical plant as
a part of its economic development plan for a depressed region of the country. Although
PetroTina has offered the plant through advertisements in industry publications at a sales
price of $30 million, the Devania government has agreed to pay $60 million for the plant.
Mr. Jones and Mr. Rodriquez will pay PetroTina $30 million for the plant, and divide the
profits. Mr. Rodriquez has told Mr. Jones that he "must receive $25 million to make the
deal work.' Mr. Jones asks his attorney to prepare a "short" contract to reflect his relation-
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ship with Mr. Rodriquez and to "protect him" In preparing the contract, Mr. Jones' attor-
ney asks him about the economics of the transaction and the reason for the disparity in
the compensation between he and Mr. Rodriquez. In response, Mr. Jones says "that's the
deal".
Is Mr. Jones' attorney under a duty to inquire further? Is the high mark-up coupled
with the unexplained disparate sharing of the profit enough to cause Mr. Jones to have
"knowingly" violated the FCPA (assuming, of course, that a portion of the $25 million
received by Mr. Rodriquez is used to pay bribes to Devania governmental officials). Does
placing FCPA representations and warranties in the agreement between Mr. Jones and
Mr. Rodriquez have any effect whatsoever in this type of transaction?
The structure of this transaction could be critical to the FCPA analysis. For example,
if Mr. Jones' attorney drafts the agreement to provide for a mere sharing of the profits, the
relationship between Mr. Jones and Mr. Rodriquez would most likely be that of a general
partnership under the laws of most U.S. states. 134 If Jones' attorney drafted the agreement
to provide that it would be governed by the laws of one of the U.S. states, the partnership
almost certainly would be a U.S. domestic concern under the FCPA even though its activ-
ities might be wholly conducted in foreign countries. 135 Thus, if an illegal FCPA payment
is made, the partnership could be prosecuted as direcdy violating the Act.
Would the result change if the transaction is structured as a buy-resell transaction
whereby Mr. Jones purchases the chemical plant from PetroTina, and then resells it to Mr.
Rodriquez for resale to the Devania government? It would appear that the buy-resale situa-
tion should be analyzed as a possible indirect violation of the FCPA. 136 In the final analy-
sis, the restructuring of the sale could create a distinction without a difference with respect
to Mr. Jones' liability since the same standard of intent will apply in either situation. 137
134. See U.P.A. § 7(4) (the sharing of profits is prima facie evidence of the existence of a partner-
ship unless the facts of the situation fall into the prescribed exceptions to this presumption).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (h)(1)(B) (1988).
136. In an advisory opinion, the Department of Justice addressed a buy-sell arrangement between
an American company, Latana Boatyard, Inc. (Latana) and a foreign corporation which antici-
pated reselling Latana's boats to the Nigerian government. The foreign corporation, Milverton
Holdings, Ltd. (Milverton) was organized under English law and wholly owned by a Nigerian
national. Under Milverton's arrangement with Latana, Latana would be fully paid for its boats
before they were delivered, and Latana would not be involved in the reselling of the boats.
Both Latana and Milverton represented that the FCPA would not be violated, and Latana
intended to obtain written certificates from its employees stating that they were not aware of
any FCPA violation. Furthermore, Latana agreed to disclose to the Nigerian government the
price and terms of its sales contract with Milverton. The Attorney General stated that the DOJ
did not intend to take action against Latana. Department of Justice Review Procedure Release,
No. 87-1, December 17, 1987 printed in 3 FCPA Rep. 724.
137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (a)(3) (issuers), 78dd-2 (a)(3) (domestic concerns) (1988).
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VL Conclusion
The FCPA creates substantial liability for the U.S. company doing business interna-
tionally, particularly in view of the fact that to be successful in many countries, the U.S.
company must utilize a variety of brokers, middlemen and other third parties. Global
competition is a fact of life in today's business environment. Thus, the successful U.S.
company cannot simply turn its back on these foreign markets. Instead, it must adopt
strategies for approaching those markets in light of the many ambiguous provisions of
the FCPA. One of those strategies includes the development and implementation of effec-
tive FCPA guidelines and procedures to avoid criminal liability in the U.S.
